What forced Azerbaijan to resort to military provocations again?

What forced Azerbaijan to resort to military provocations again?


The steps taken by Azerbaijan to sharply aggravate the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in Artsakh over the past few days raise a number of questions. From May 2021 to mid-December 2021, the goal of the policy of military blackmail against Armenia was clear: to force Armenia to at least indirectly recognize Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan, to agree to the launch of a corridor / road connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and Turkey through the Syunik region. Azerbaijan achieved these goals in December 2021.

First, at a meeting in Brussels on December 14, the parties finally agreed on the launch of the Azerbaijan-Syunik-Nakhichevan railway. Then, during a press conference on December 24, 2021, the Prime Minister of Armenia stated that Artsakh has no chance to be outside Azerbaijan. In fact, for the first time since 1988, the Armenian leader mentioned that Artsakh should be part of Azerbaijan. This was the culmination of Azerbaijan’s dreams, in these conditions the question arises, what has changed since December 24, 2021, which has forced Azerbaijan to re-enter the policy of military pressure. One of the options is to change the position of the RA government. Maybe the Armenian government has told Azerbaijan through closed pipes that it rejects the idea of ​​building a railway connecting Azerbaijan through Nakhichevan through Syunik, or at least Shushi, which considers the Hadrut region as an occupied territory, demands the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops. However, the probability of this option is close to zero. In case of radical changes in the position of the Armenian government, information would be leaked, if not by the Armenians, then at least by the Azerbaijani authorities.

The second option is the complete elimination of rational thinking in the military-political leadership of Azerbaijan, which means that it is impossible to logically analyze the actions of Azerbaijan. However, there are no grounds for such a claim.

In this context, it must be acknowledged that the only radical change in the region since December 24, 2021, is the developments in Kazakhstan, including the decision to deploy a CSTO peacekeeping force. Therefore, it can be concluded that the recent aggressive actions of Azerbaijan are related to the events in Kazakhstan. In all likelihood, Azerbaijan is not “punishing Armenia” for voting in favor of the CSTO decision or sending 100 Armenian troops to Kazakhstan, but is sending a message to Russia that it can significantly destabilize the situation in the South Caucasus and create an additional headache for Russia. US-Russia-NATO intensive աչափ against the background of rather complicated negotiations. If this hypothesis is close to reality, then the author of the message is not so much Azerbaijan as Turkey, which would prefer to see the more intensive role of the Organization of Turkic States in the Kazakh events, as opposed to the CSTO.



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